Groucho Marxism

Questions and answers on socialism, Marxism, and related topics

  • Capitalism and mental health

    I have suffered from depression for most of my life; and I am not alone. According to data from the Office for National Statistics, approximately 1 in 6 adults in the UK experience mental health problems like depression or anxiety in any given week. Furthermore, according to data from the NHS Business Services Authority, around 1 in 6 people in England were prescribed at least one antidepressant medication in 2023/24; and a 2023 BBC investigation found that over two million people in England have been taking antidepressants for five years or more. Moreover, usage of these medications has risen for six consecutive years. The UK is clearly experiencing a significant, growing mental health crisis. But what is causing this?

    Recently, some researchers have argued that the structure of a competitive, profit-driven society is fundamentally incompatible with human psychological needs, instead serving as a mental illness-generating system. One such researcher is British medic Dr. James Davis, who in 2021 published a book entitled Sedated: How Modern Capitalism Created our Mental Health Crisis. Using a wealth of studies, interviews with experts, and detailed analysis, Davies argues we have fundamentally mischaracterised the problem of mental ill-health. Rather than viewing mental distress as an understandable reaction to wider societal problems, we have embraced a medical model which situates the problem solely within the sufferer’s brain. In effect, we have resorted to blaming the victim.

    The standard medical explanation for depression is that it is caused by ‘chemical imbalances’ in the brain (whatever that means). Davis argues instead that mental illness is caused by a combination of modern environmental and economic stressors. There are several mechanisms through which this manifests. The pressure to secure basic needs such as housing and healthcare causes significant anxiety and depression, especially among lower-income groups. Growing income gaps also directly correlate to poor mental health outcomes. Modern work environments characterized by precarious employment, long hours, and high demands create a culture of burnout and mental fatigue. And the work that people do often lacks meaning, leading to feelings of alienation, inadequacy, and disempowerment.

    In his 2015 book The Burnout Society, the South Korean philosopher and cultural theorist Byung-Chul Han characterizes today’s society as a pathological landscape of conditions such as depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, borderline personality disorder, and burnout. And in his 2017 book ‘Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power, Han argues that modern capitalism has moved beyond the simple struggle between classes described by Marx: “When production is immaterial, everyone already owns the means of production, him- or herself. The neoliberal system is no longer a class system in the proper sense … This is what accounts for the system’s stability.”

    Han argues further that we have all effectively become self-exploiters: “Today, everyone is an auto-exploiting labourer in his or her own enterprise. People are now master and slave in one. Even class struggle has transformed into an inner struggle against oneself.” According to Han, this shift from class struggle to inner struggle is the primary cause of our current malaise. That’s not to say that the conflict between workers and capitalists no longer exists; clearly it does, and is as relevant as ever in understanding the workings of capitalism. Han’s point is that under modern neoliberal capitalism, us workers do not believe that we are exploited “subjects” but rather “projects” that are always “refashioning and reinventing ourselves.”

    Thus, according to Han, modern capitalism is as much state of mind as it is a socio-economic system. This idea has a lot in common with the ‘capitalist realism’ concept popularized by British philosopher Mark Fisher in his 2009 book Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?. In this brilliant little book, Fisher defined capitalist realism as “the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it.” Elsewhere, Fisher wrote extensively about the link between capitalism and mental health, stating that “the pandemic of mental anguish that afflicts our time cannot be properly understood, or healed, if viewed as a private problem suffered by damaged individuals.”

    Fisher also wrote about his own struggles with depression. Tragically, these struggles eventually became too much for him and he committed suicide in 2017 at the age of 48. This is far from uncommon: around 7,000 people die by suicide in the UK every year. I myself have known two people who have committed suicide in the last 5 years. The work of researchers such as Davis, Han, and Fisher suggests that these deaths should be added to the list of people who are killed by capitalism and highlights once again what a dystopian system capitalism is.

  • Why are the US and Israel bombing Iran?

    It has been less than three weeks since the US and Israel effectively declared war on Iran but already thousands have been killed and no less than 14 countries have been bombed, including Israel itself. How long the war will continue is not clear. What is clear is that the US and Israel have massively underestimated Iran’s ability to fight back. It is also clear that the war will have impacts that go way beyond the Middle East. Already in Britain we have seen petrol prices begin to increase as firms aim to protect their profits from the oil supply shock caused by Iran blocking the Straight of Hormuz. Similar price rises are likely to happen across the world, including in the US. This raises the question of why the US and Israel have launched an offensive that is likely to impact so negatively on their own citizens.

    For the second time in less than a year, the US and Israel have taken military action against a another country at a time when a breakthrough in negotiations with that country was imminent. We saw this first with Venezuela and the kidnapping of president Maduro and we have seen the same thing happen now with the attack on Iran. The fact that this has happened twice in quick succession suggests that it is no mere coincidence. On both occasions, the US and Israel decided to take military action when they did precisely because they knew a deal was on the cards. Or more accurately, as Oman’s foreign minister pointed out last week, Israel persuaded the US to take military action because Israel knew a deal was on the cards.

    Israel patently has zero interest in diplomacy. Instead, it wants to turn Iran into a failed state as this will enable it to more easily pursue the ‘greater Israel’ agenda. Israel didn’t want negotiations between the US and Iran to succeed so it persuaded the US to bomb Iran instead. You might wonder how a relatively small country like Israel could convince a superpower like the US to do what it wants. The answer lies partly in the narcissistic character of the current US president. Trump is the perfect president from Israel’s point of view as his ego can be used to manipulate him. Netenyahu obviously managed to convince Trump that in perpetrating this conflict he would go down in history as the ‘big man’ who finally managed to defeat Iran.

    However, as already mentioned, Trump and Netenyahu massively underestimated Iran’s ability to fight back. The US also apparently did not foresee that Iran would block the Straight of Hormuz. Trump has responded by desperately trying to form a coalition of imperialist powers to provide warships to defend shipping in the straight – so far to no avail. The leaders of these countries understand how incredibly unpopular this war is with their respective electorates. Facing worldwide opposition to the war, the US and Israel have sought to justify their actions by highlighting the repressive and brutal character of the Iranian regime; but few are buying this argument. Israel’s genocide in Gaza has laid bare the hypocrisy of such moral justifications.

    The leaders of the US and other imperialist nations regularly tell us what a terrible country Iran is, but these same leaders have been shamefully silent on the Gaza massacre and are now silent on Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon. Netanyahu regularly speaks of the ‘terrorist regime’ in Iran, but at other times seems to be quite fond of terrorism. Nearly 80 years ago, anti-Palestinian terrorist group Irgun blew up a hotel in Palestine, killing 96 people. Sixty years later, in 2006, Netenyahu attended the anniversary celebration of this attack. Netanyahu’s attendance was not a surprise as the leader of Irgun was one of the co-founders of the movement that in 1988 became his party, Likud. The hypocrisy is off the charts.

    Western leaders may not be joining in with the US-Israeli attacks on Iran but it is notable that few are calling for these attacks to stop. During last year’s US-Israeli attack on Iran, German chancellor Merz blurted out the truth that the bombing represented “the dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us”. Still, it seems unlikely that other Western countries will allow themselves to be dragged into this war any time soon. Many are still aggrieved about being hit by Trump’s tariffs and are therefore reluctant to come to his aid. Aside from that, Western leaders are wary about doing anything that might escalate the conflict as they know this will rebound negatively on them. If only Trump and Netanyahu had the same foresight.

  • The generalized FMT

    A central question of Marx’s Das Capital is: why is capitalism profitable and productive? Marx’s answer to this question boils down to: because capitalists exploit workers. But why does worker exploitation result in positive profits and positive growth? To tackle this problem scientifically, Marx had to go it alone as much of the mathematical apparatus economists use today had not yet been invented. He first used the classical labour theory of value to calculate the value or the labour-time directly or indirectly necessary to produce a unit of each commodity. He then divided the total supply of labour by a worker, T, into a paid part T* and an unpaid part T-T*, both measured in terms of labour time; and he defined the ‘rate of exploitation’ by (T-T*)/T*.

    Using this definition, Marx established a theorem to the effect that the equilibrium profit rate and the equilibrium growth rate are positive if and only if the rate of exploitation is positive. It is important to note that his proof relied on the labour theory of value. As soon as durable capital goods, joint production, and choice of techniques are admitted, we must discard the labour theory of value, at least in the way Marx formulated it. This raises the question of whether Marx’s theorem still holds in under these more general assumptions. In 1974, the Japanese Marxist economist Michio Miroshima tackled this question and found the answer to be ‘yes’ in the case where we allow joint production, whereby several outputs from a single activity can emerge together.

    Consider an economy which produces m types of commodities using n processes, where in general m is not equal to n. Assume that the economy employs N workers, where each workers works on average T hours per day and is paid wages at a subsistence level. Let us denote the mx1 subsistence-consumption column vector (per worker) by C, so that N units of C are required to keep the N workers alive for one day. We can then define the ‘necessary labour time’ for the economy as the minimum labour time necessary to produce consumption goods, CN, and the ‘surplus labour’ as the total labour time per day, TN, minus the necessary labour time. This definition of necessary labour was introduced by Miroshima in his 1974 paper.

    In each process j, quantities Aij ≥ 0 are used up and quantities Bij ≥ 0 are produced of commodity type i, and a quantity Lj of labour time is also used. Let A and B denote the mxn matrices with elements Aij and Bij, and let L denote the 1xn row vector with elements Lj. Each commodity i will have an associated price pi, and each process j will be used with an ‘intensity’ qj. Given a 1xm price vector p = (pi), the vector pA represents the total cost of operating the different processes and the vector pB represents the total revenue obtained from the different processes. Similarly, given an nx1 intensity vector q = (qj), the vector Aq represents the total commodities of different types used up, the vector Bq represents the total commodities of different types produced, and the scalar Lq represents the total labour time used.

    Under Miroshima’s definition, the necessary labour time required to produce consumption goods C is given by the minimum value of Lq subject to the constraints q ≥ 0 and Bq ≥ Aq+ CN. This is referred to as a ‘linear programming’ problem, as it involves minimizing a linear function subject to linear constraints. Let q* be a solution to this problem, so that the necessary labour time is given by Lq*. Then the surplus labour is given by TN-Lq* and the rate of exploitation by (TN-Lq*)/Lq*. Next, consider the ‘dual’ linear programming problem of finding the maximum of pCN subject to the constraints p ≥ 0 and pB ≤ pA+L. Let p* be a solution to this problem. Then by the so-called ‘duality theorem’ of linear programming, we have p*CN = Lq*, and the rate of exploitation is therefore given by (T-p*C)/p*C.

    Let w ≥ 0 be the wage rate. As wages are assumed to be set at subsistence level, we have wT = pC, therefore w = pD where D = C/T. Let rj be the rate of profit for process j. The 1xm price vector p satisfies (pB)j = (1+rj)p(A+DL)j for each j. Letting r* = max rj, we must then have pB ≤ (1+r*)p(A+DL). This inequality says that the revenue at the next time step – i.e. pB – cannot be more than was spent at the previous time step multiplied by 1 + the maximum profit rate – i.e. (1+r*)p(A+DL). Now let gi be the growth rate of commodities of type i. The nx1 intensity vector satisfies (Bq)i = (1+gi)(Aq+DL)i for each i. Letting g* = min gi, we must then have Bq ≥ (1+g*)(pA+DL). This inequality says that what the economy to consumes at the next time step – i.e. (1+g*)(pA+DL) – cannot be more than was produced at the previous time step – i.e. Bq.

    The profit rate that is guaranteed in this economy is given by the minimum value of r* satisfying the inequality pB ≤ (1+r*)p(A+DL) for some p > 0. We may refer to this minimum value as the ‘warranted profit rate’. Similarly, the growth rate that is guaranteed by this economy is the maximum value of g* satisfying the inequality Bq ≥ (1+g*)(pA+DL) for some q > 0. We may refer to this minimum value as the ‘warranted growth rate’. Miroshima proved that under some relatively weak assumptions, the following statements are equivalent: (1) the warranted profit and warranted growth rate are greater than zero; (2) the rate of exploitation is greater than zero. This result is referred to as the ‘generalized fundamental Marxian theorem’.

    The theorem states that the propositions (1) the economy is profitable and productive, and (2) capitalists exploit workers, are equivalent. It demonstrates that Marx’s key insight in Das Capital – that capitalism is profitable and productive because capitalists exploit workers – holds in more general economies with joint production.

  • How to waste money

    The ‘Astute’ class is the latest class of nuclear-powered fleet submarines in service with the Royal Navy. The Astute program began in 1986 when the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) launched several studies to determine requirements for replacement of its existing submarines. These studies were conducted during the Cold War, when the Royal Navy maintained a strong emphasis on anti-submarine warfare to counter increasingly capable Soviet submarines. However, by 1990 the Cold War had come to an end. The project was promptly cancelled and a new set of design studies were started, this time with cost control as a key objective. As we will see, to say that this objective was not met is something of an understatement.

    A joint design by GEC-Marconi and British Maritime Technology was favoured both cost and capability grounds. With the signing of the contract in 1997, GEC-Marconi started work on developing a complete and comprehensive design for the Astute program. In 1999, British Aerospace purchased GEC-Marconi and created BAE Systems. By 2002 both BAE and the MoD recognized they had underestimated the technical challenges and costs of the program, as much rework was needed once the detailed designs were complete. In 2009, a House of Commons Defence Select Committee found that delays due to technical issues brought the Astute program to a position of being 57 months late and £1.3 billion (53%) over budget, with a forecast cost of £3.9 billion for the first three boats.

    In 2015, the National Audit Office (NAO) forecast that the total cost of producing seven boats would be £9.6 billion, £1.4 billion (17%) over budget. In 2024, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority reported the total cost of the Astute programme had risen to £11.3 billion, explained by “inflation and delivery cadence within the shipyard”. And in 2025, the MoD reported that the Astute program will cost £12.2 billion. This £12.2 billion figure is almost three times the initial £4.3 billion forecast made by the NAO back in 2001. Some of the £7.9 billion discrepancy is attributable to inflation, which has been higher than predicted since 2022. But the vast majority is due to a combination factors that could have been avoided.

    These factors included design failures, a shortage of technical expertise, poor contract management, a lack of quality control, and a declining industrial base. The project was initially viewed as “low-risk” but turned into a 70% new design. In 2001, it had been nearly 17 years since the UK had built a first-of-class submarine, resulting in a shortage of skilled workers. Early contractual agreements were counterproductive, with engineering work having to be ripped out and redone. Early ships in the class suffered from problems with subcontractors providing sub-standard materials, leading to costly repairs and extensive testing. And the supply chain for specialized submarine components had declined significantly by 2001.

    These issues led to long delays, which meant the program required more labor hours than estimated, with additional costs also stemming from the need to manage complex, shifting technical requirements. To put the £7.9 billion overspend figure into perspective, with this money the government could have built around 20 new hospitals, 100 new schools, or 40,000 new council houses. And that’s just the overspend. The £12.2 billion spent on the project as a whole would have paid for around 30 new hospitals, 150 new schools, or 60,000 new council houses. As eye watering as these figures seem, however, they pale into insignificance when compared to the costs of another submarine program known as Dreadnought.

    The UK maintains a stockpile of around 215 nuclear warheads, with around 120 active (usable). Since 1998 the British nuclear arsenal has been wholly submarine-based. Dreadnought is name of the program to replace the four Vanguard class submarines, which have provided the ‘continuous at-sea defence’ since 1992, with four new submarines that will be built in the UK. The four new submarines will be introduced, on current plans, from the 2030s onwards and will have a lifespan of at least 30 years. The Dreadnought submarines will carry the Trident Missile System. In 2011, the UK government approved the initial assessment phase for the new submarines and authorized the purchase of long lead-time items.

    When the project was approved in 2011, manufacturing the four submarines was forecast to cost £25 billion in total. In 2015, this figure was updated to £31 billion. These costs do not include the related Trident missile renewal, new infrastructure projects at the re-nationalized Atomic Weapons Establishment, or new nuclear fuel production facilities at Rolls-Royce. Annual in-service costs are expected to be approximately 6% of the defence budget (around £3 billion). The Nuclear Information Service and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament estimate a lifetime cost in the region of £200 billion. With this money the government could build around 500 new hospitals, 2,500 new schools, or 1 million new council houses.

    Meanwhile, politicians tell us there is no money to properly fund public services! They must think we are stupid.

  • The death of Stalinism

    To most people, ‘Stalinism’ refers to the totalitarian, state-driven methods of rule and ideology implemented by Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union from 1929 to 1953. However, socialists tend to use the term ‘Stalinism’ in a broader sense. For most socialists, ‘Stalinism’ refers to the prevailing ideology of the Soviet Union from 1929 up until its collapse in 1989, and by extension, to the prevailing ideology in countries aligned with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and elsewhere across the world. Thus, what most people call socialism, socialists call Stalinism. It is necessary that we clearly separate the two as the method of rule implemented by the Soviet Union and its allies represented a gross perversion of socialist ideas.

    It is no accident that Stalinism has become conflated with socialism. This conflation was encouraged by the ruling classes in capitalist countries, particularly when the Soviet Union went into decline in the 1970s, as a way to brainwash the people living in these countries into believing that ‘socialism doesn’t work’. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 this process reached its apogee, with the American political scientist Frances Fukiyama famously declaring the ‘end of history’. It is easy to poke fun at Fukiyama’s claim. But his central point was that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies was largely at an end, with socialism defeated and the world settling on liberal democracy. At that time there were few who disagreed.

    In today’s unstable world, capitalist triumphalism has been replaced by pessimism. The turning point was undoubtedly the 2008 global financial crisis. Prior to that, we were constantly told what a brilliant system capitalism is and how it had led to a period of unprecedented peace and stability. This lie became impossible to maintain after 2008. The message now is: capitalism might not be perfect, in fact in many ways it’s rubbish; but it’s the best system we can come up with so you have to stop complaining and just get on with it. Of course, this is also a lie. Contrary to what many people seem to think, it would not be difficult to come up with a better socioeconomic system than capitalism, as pretty much any socioeconomic system would be better than capitalism.

    There are also socioeconomic systems that are (arguably) worse than capitalism – one of which is Stalinism. It is important to point out that Stalinism had nothing in common with the workers’ democracy that was being built after the Bolsheviks’ victory in the 1917 Russian Revolution. Sadly, in the absence of successful socialist revolutions taking place elsewhere in more economically developed countries, the nascent Russian workers’ state was left isolated and the nation was plunged into a civil war which stretched the economy to its limits. This led to the development of a centralized bureaucracy, which over time began to exert more and more control over the populace. Anyone suspected of providing even the mildest opposition was brutally suppressed.

    Still, many Marxists predicted that the working class would eventually push aside the parasitic bureaucrats. Indeed, the revolt that shook the foundations of the Stalinist regimes in 1989 began with demands for democratic reform, not capitalist restoration. However, largely thanks to Stalin’s purges, those that could have provided the necessary revolutionary leadership had been wiped out. By the late 1980s, bureaucratic misrule had brought economic growth in Stalinist states to a complete standstill. It wasn’t always this way: up until the 1960s, despite bureaucratic mismanagement, the advantages of a planned economy meant that the Soviet Union experience economic growth that easily outpaced growth in capitalist states. But there was also huge wastage and massive environmental degradation.

    Genuine socialist planning requires genuine democracy. Such democracy never really existed in the Soviet Union, and certainly not under Stalin. This is was ultimately what led to the collapse of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For the working class of Russia, what followed was not the improvements they had hoped for but economic collapse. The working class internationally also paid a heavy price as the demise of the planned economies of Eastern Europe dealt a blow to the idea that society could be organized in a different way. This led to the wholesale collapse of workers’ organizations. Leaders of trade unions sought to accommodate capitalism, to the detriment of their members.

    The demise of Stalinism in no way resolved any of the inherent contradictions of global capitalism. Unfortunately the absence of mass workers’ parties has made it much harder for working class consciousness to develop. This highlights why it’s so important that we rebuild workers’ organizations across the world.

  • Ending this system of war and crisis

    US and Israeli missiles are currently raining down on Iran. Neither Donald Trump nor Benjamin Netenyahu are motivated by ending the suffering of the Iranian people, despite what they might claim. Instead, both are motivated by distracting the citizens of their respective nations from their growing disaffection. Reports are emerging that the US is attempting to arm minorities within Iran with a view to encouraging them to take on the Iranian government. But the implosion of the Iranian dictatorship, if that were to happen, would be very unlikely to produce a new government that would bend the knee to US and Israeli imperialism. As the negative consequences of the war inevitably rack up, Trump and Netenyahu will find themselves under increasing pressure to find an off ramp.

    It is difficult to see what such an off ramp will look like. By attacking Iran, the US and Israel may have bitten off more than they can chew. Last week the US was forced to hastily redeploy missiles from South Korea to Middle East, which led to South Korea’s president having to reassure the public that the country is still able to deter threats from the North. Meanwhile, Trump’s MAGA base is rapidly losing faith in the president, who came into office on a promise of ending wars, not starting them. Trump himself apparently believes that he has divine purpose and intelligence after surviving that (possibly staged) assassination event. But he will surely go down as one of the worst presidents in US history. It feels as though we are witnessing the collapse of the American empire in real time.

    Britain is likely to be hit hard by the global turmoil created by the conflict. Households across the UK are once again bracing for a rise in energy bills, with oil prices soaring as global supply chains are thrown into disarray. Energy bills have been predicted to rise by around £160 per household on average this year. I suspect this will turn out to be an underestimate. Of course, energy companies and government ministers claim that these increases are an inevitable result of rising global energy prices. We have heard this story before. Isn’t it funny how when energy costs fall, energy companies keep the gains; but when energy costs rise, these increased costs get passed on to the consumer? It’s almost as if the whole system is rigged!

    The war is also adding to Keir Starmer’s difficulties. By equivocating on the conflict Starmer has managed to pull off his usual trick of annoying everyone across the entire political spectrum. Has there ever been a more inept politician?! Well, Trump maybe. No doubt Starmer’s slightly critical stance on the US and Israel’s actions is due in part to the scale of the anti-war movement in the UK. Labour is facing wipe-out in the forthcoming local elections and Starmer must know that uncritical support for the war will only make things worse. Even so, the predominant feeling amongst working people in Britain is one of powerlessness. We are not powerless though. The working class in Britain and internationally is a potential superpower that can put an end to these imperial wars for good.

    There are several ways in which we can go about doing this. Trade Unions can call anti-war demonstrations; students can organize in schools and on campuses to protest for a future free from war; and we can all build a mass workers’ party that stands anti-war candidates in elections. We are seeing some of these things happening already, for example with students and workers protesting against the war across the UK. But we need to do more. It should be clear to everyone by now that capitalism means war. We must fight for socialist change in Britain and across the world to bring an end to this imperial warmongering once and for all.

  • Plain velars in the satem languages

    In a recent blog post I summarized some phonological conditions under which Proto-Indo-European (PIE) plain velars remained intact in the satem languages. In this blog post, I will go through these phonological conditions in a bit more detail. Specifically, I will provide evidence that in all the satem languages, palatalization of plain velars was blocked after *s and non-syllabic *n, and also before *r; in all the satem languages apart from Armenian, palatalization was blocked before *o; in Indic, palatalization was blocked before *s; in Balto-Slavic and Albanian, palatalization was blocked before resonants and *u when followed by a back vowel; and in Baltic, palatalization was blocked before *st. Let’s start with the position after *s.

    Blocking of palatalization after *s was discussed recently by Woodhouse (2014) and is well attested, e.g.: *(s)kelH- ‘cut’ > Sanskrit kalā́, Armenian čelkʿem, Albanian hel, Lthuanian skeliù, Gothic skilja (Pokorny 1959:923-927); *(s)kerH- ‘cut’ > Skt. apa-skara-, Avs. čarəman-, Arm. kʿerem, Alb. shqerr, Lth. sker̃sti, Old Church Slavonic črěvo, Greek κείρω (Pok.:938-947); *(s)keuH-, *(s)kuH- ‘cover’ > Skt. skunāti, Lth. kẽvalas, Russian kútatь, Grk. σκύ̄νια (Pok.:951-953). Note that the *s was subsequently lost in many of these reflexes. As noted by Woodhouse (2014), this blocking did not operate before front vowels in Iranian, e.g.: *(s)keH₁i-, *(s)kH₁i- ‘shadow’ > Skt. chāyā́, Avs. a-saya-, Alb. hie, Latvian seja, OCS sijati, Grk. σκιά̄ (Pok.:917-918).

    Blocking of palatalization after non-syllabic *n was established by Steensland (1973:88) and is also well attested, e.g.: *H₂enk- ‘bend’ > Skt. añcati, Avs. anku-, Arm. ankiwn, Lth. anka, OCS  jęčьmy, Grk. ἀγκών (Pok.:45-47), c.f. *H₂ek- ‘sharp’ > Skt. aśáni-, Avs. asəŋga-, Arm. aseɫn, Alb. athëtë, Lth. ašnìs, OCS osla, Grk. ἀκή (Pok.:19-22); *lung- ‘break’ > Alb. lungë, c.f. *leug- ~ *lug-  ‘break’ > Skt. rujáti, Avs. uruxti, Arm. lucanem, Lth. láužiu, Grk. λυγρός (Pok.:686); *meng- ~ *mong- ‘beautify’ > Skt. maṅgalá-, Ossetian mäng, Alb. mangë, Lth. mánga, Grk. μάγγανον (Pok.: 731); *spreng- ‘turn’ > Lth. sprengė́ti, c.f. *sprg- ‘turn’ > Grk. σπάργω (Pok.:991-992). Note that this blocking did not operate after *m, e.g.: *H₂emg- ‘narrow’ > Avs. ązaŋhē, OCS ǫžǫ, Hit. hamanki (Pok.: 42-43, Rix (ed.) 2001:264-265).

    Blocking of palatalization before *r was also established by Steensland (1973:43), and is again well attested, e.g.: *gerH₂- ~ *grH₂- ‘shriek’ > Skt. járatē, Arm. krunk, Alb. ngurónj, Lth. gùrti, OCS graču, Grk. γέρην (Pok.:383-385); *kerH₂- ~ *korH₂- ~ *krH₂- ‘shriek’ > Skt. śāri-, krkara-, Arm. sareak, karkač̣, Alb. sorrë, Lth. šárka, kirkiù, OCS soraka, krъknǫti, Grk. κέρκαξ (Pok.:567-671); *suekruH₂ ~ *suekurH₂ ‘in-law’ > Skt. śváśura-, Avs. xvasura-, Arm. skesur, Alb. vjehërr, Lth. šẽšuras, OCS svekry (Pok.:1043-1044). Palatalization was sometimes introduced analogically before*r in Indo-Iranian and Balto-Slavic, e.g.: *gerH₂- ~ *grH₂- ‘grow’ > Skt. járate, Avs. azarəšant-, Arm. cer, Alb. grurë, Lth. žìrnis, OCS zьrěti, Grk. ἐγείρω (Pok.:390-391).

    There are many examples to back up the claim that palatalization was blocked before *o Balto-Slavic and Albanian, e.g.: *bherghos ‘mountain’ > Arm. berj, OCS brěgъ, Gothic baurgs, c.f. *bhergh- ~ *bhrgh- ‘high’ > Skt. barháyati, Avs. bərəzant- (Pok.:140-141); *kei- ~ *kei- ‘lie down’ > Skt. śáyē, Avs. saēte, Arm. sēr, Lth. šeimýna, káimas, OCS sěmьja, Grk. κεῖται (Pok.:539-540); *kerH₂- ~ *korH₂- ~ *krH₂- ‘horn’ > Skt. śíras-, Avs. sarah-, Arm. sar, Alb. ka, Lth. šìršė, kárvė, OCS sъrъšenь, Russian koróva, Grk. κάρ (Pok.:674-577). The unpalatalized velar sometimes spread analogically, e.g.: *legh- ~ *logh- ‘lie down’ > Alb. lagje, Lth. pa-lėgỹs, Bulgarian ležǫ, Grk. λέχετα, c.f. *loghos ‘encampment’ > Alb. lag, Blg. log, Grk λόχος (Pok.:658-659).

    Similarly, there are many examples to back up the claim that palatalization was blocked before *o in Indo-Iranian, e.g.: *-ghe ~ *-gho ~ *-ghi (enclitic particle) > Skt. ha, gha, hí, Avs. zī, Lth. -gu, OCS -go, Grk. -χί (Pok.:418); *H₃moigho- ‘mist’ > Skt. meghá, Avs. maēγa-, Lth. miẽgas, Russ. migátʹ, c.f. *H₃meigh- ‘urinate’ > Skt. mḗhati, Avs. maēzaiti, Arm. mizem, Grk. ὀμείχειν, Lth. mę̃žù, Serbo-Croat mìžâm (Pok.:712-713); *ker- ~ *kor- ‘dark’ > Skt. karaṭa-, Arm. saṙn, Alb. thjer-më, Lth. šer̃kšnas, OCS srěnъ, Grk. κόρυζα; (Pok.:573-574); *leukos ‘bright’ > Skt. lōká-, Arm. lois, Lth. laũkas, Grk. λευκός, c.f. *luk- ‘shine’ > Skt. rúśant, Arm. lusanunkʿ, OCS vъs-lysъ, Old High German luhs (Pok.:687-690). Thus, there is evidence that palatalization was blocked before *o in all the satem languages except Armenian.

    It is well known that palatalization was blocked before *s in Indic, e.g.: *H₂nekseti ‘reach’ > Skt. nákṣati, c.f. *H₂nek- ‘reach’ > Skt. náśati, Avs. -nasaiti, Lth. nešù, OCS nesǫ, Grk. δι-ηνεκής (Pok.:316-318). This rule also operated in reflexes of ‘thorn clusters’, e.g.: *dhghem- ‘earth’ > Skt. kṣam-, Avs. zā̊, Alb. dhe, Lth. žẽmė, OCS zemlja, Grk. χθών (Pok.:414-416). Note that *-ks- yields *-š- in Iranian, e.g.: *deks- ‘take’ > Skt. dákṣiṇa-, Avs. dašina-, Alb. djathtë, Lth. dẽšinas, OCS desnъ, Grk. δεξιτερός (Pok.:189-191); *H₂eks ‘axe’ > Skt. ákṣ̌aḥ, Lth. ašìs, OCS osъ Grk. ἅξων (Pok.:4-6); *tetk- ‘make’ > Skt. takṣati, Avs. tašaiti, Ltv. tešu, OCS tesati, Grk. τέκτων. The blocking in Indic did not operate word-finally, e.g.: *sueks ‘six’ > Skt. ṣáṭ, Avs. xšvaš, Arm. vec̣, Alb. gjashtë, Lth. šešì, OCS šestь, Grk. ἕξ (Pok.:1044).

    Blocking of palatalization before resonants and *u plus a back vowel in Balto-Slavic and Albanian was discussed by Kortlandt (1978, 2008) and is well attested, e.g.: *ghelH- ~ *gholH- ~ *ghloH- ‘shine’ > Skt. hári-, Avs. zari-, Alb. dhelpërë, Lth. želiù, glodùs, OCS zelenъ, gladъkъ, Grk. χόλος (Pok.:429-434); *H₂egnos ‘agile’ > Lth. agnùs (Otkupščikov 1967), c.f. *H₂eg- > Skt. ájati, Avs. azaiti, Arm. acem Grk. ἄγω (Pok.:4-6); *H₂ekmen ~ *H₂ekmon ‘stone’ > Skt. aśman-, Avs. asman-, Lth. ãšmens, akmuõ, OCS kamy, Grk. ἄκμων (Pok.:18-22); *kleu- ~ *klou- ~ *klu- ‘hear’ > Skt. śrudhí, Avs. surunaoiti, Alb. quaj, Lth. šlovė̃, klausaũ, OCS slovo, Grk. κλέω (Pok.:605-607, Orrel 1998); *kuon- ~ *kun- ‘dog’ > Skt. śvā́, Avs. spā, Arm. šun, Lth. šuõ (gen. šuñs), Sudovian kuo, Grk. κύων (Pok.:632-633, Zinkevičius 1985).

    Finally, note that there are several examples to back up the claim that palatalization was blocked before *st in Baltic, e.g.: *H₂eksti- ‘sharp’ > Lth. akstìs, OCS ostъnъ, Welsh eithin, c.f. *H₂ek- ‘sharp’, above; *H₂emghst- ‘tight’ > Lth. añkštas, c.f. *H₂emgh- ‘narrow’, above.

  • Happy International Women’s Day!

    I am a bit late with this as International Women’s Day was actually last Sunday. Regardless, I felt it important to post something on the historical significance of International Women’s Day and why we should celebrate it. The origins of International Women’s Day (IWD) can be traced back to the late 19th century. At that time political representation had yet to extend to women, so women were engaged in their own fight for suffrage both in Britain and elsewhere and in this context the idea of an international women’s organisation was born. In the early 20th century working class and socialist movements began sweeping across Europe and America. In February 1909 a ‘National Woman’s Day’ was first proposed by Theresa Malkiel, American labour activist.

    This day officially became IWD in 1911 and in 1913 IWD was recognized in Russia for the first time. Women played a central role in the period leading up to the Russian Revolution. In 1917, female textile workers in St Petersburg went on strike demanding an end to war, Tsarism, and the shortage of food. The date when the strike commenced in the Gregorian calendar fell on the 8 March which has since been adopted as IWD worldwide. The liberation of women formed a key component of the Bolshevik’s program and the revolution paved the way for subsequent gains by many women in the capitalist world. The UN officially adopted the day in 1977, with many countries now celebrating it as a public holiday.

    Whilst the “historical defeat of the female sex”, as Engels phrased it, resulted from changes to society through the Neolithic Revolution, the oppression of women continues to this day. If anything it is getting worse. A recent global survey garnering 23,000 responses across 26 countries indicated that as many as 31% of Gen Z men – that is, men born roughly between 1997 and 2012  – believe that ‘a wife should always obey her husband’, compared to just 13% of those aged 60 or over. Interestingly, 18% of Gen Z women also agreed. According to a recent report from the United Nations, women globally hold 64% of the legal rights of men, exposing them to discrimination, violence, and exclusion at every stage of their lives.

    That is not to say that women have not continued the fight to overcome their struggles. The ‘second wave’ women’s movement of the 1960s and 70s developed alongside a radicalisation of society that saw of anti-war protests, the struggle for civil rights, student movements, the fight for gay rights, working class labour movements, and anti-colonial revolutions. The 2007-8 global recession and its aftermath led to protests in 2011 against victim blaming for violence against women and girls, and the #MeToo movement aimed to empower victims of sexual assault through a phrase demonstrating empathy, solidarity, and strength in numbers. But lack of a unified strategy has resulted in the fragmentation of the women’s movement and stifled its broader aim to fundamentally transform society.

    The theme for this year’s IWD  is ‘giving support’, which has many interpretations. It can mean direct action, such that taken by women across Europe in 1914, who held rallies to campaign for the end of war and express solidarity with their sisters. It can mean pushing for legislative and administrative changes, for example by enhancing women’s roles within trade unions. It can mean setting up groups to address oppression of women directly, such as the Zhenotdel (women’s department) that was set up in Russia in 1919 to raise the consciousness of women and campaign to fully involve them in the building of a new society. Or it can mean women being a voice for their sisters, like Joeli Brearley, who launched ‘Pregnant Then Screwed’ in 2015 to give free advice and support for pregnant women in the workplace.

    With increased numerical strength in the workforce, working class women have more opportunity than ever to take action in their own right. It is clear that women cannot rely on female capitalist politicians, who might make some legislative changes in favour of women’s rights but ultimately will seek only to defend the interests of the capitalist class. Real and lasting change can only be made for women if the capitalist system as a whole is challenged – and this can only be achieved through revolutionary means. The struggle is not one of women against men, nor of women changing themselves, but women organising and uniting to end capitalism and bring forward socialism.  This is the real message behind International Women’s Day.

  • Can you get an ought from an is?

    The is–ought problem, first articulated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, concerns the question of whether we can make claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is. Hume himself thought not, arguing that at an ethical or judgemental conclusion cannot be inferred from purely descriptive factual statements. The same view was put forward by the 20th century English philosopher G.E. Moore using what he dubbed the ‘open question argument’. Moore’s argument may be summarized as follows: if X is objectively good, then the question “is it true that X is objectively good?” is meaningless; but the question “is X good?” is never meaningless, as it is an open question; therefore X cannot be objectively good.

    It is remarkable that such a shaky argument can hold any sway in philosophical circles. Each step in the chain of reasoning has obvious holes. First and foremost, if a statement Y is objectively true, it doesn’t follow that the question “is Y objectively true?” is meaningless. This objection is particularly relevant in situations when we don’t know whether Y is objectively true or not. Second, it is not hard to come up with statements X that are objectively true but where the question “is X good?” is meaningless. And third, even you ignore the first two problems, the argument as a whole is circular as it assumes that the question “is X good?” is open, which, according to Moore’s logic, is only true if X is not objectively good – the very thing we were meant to be demonstrating!

    So much for the open question argument. What about arguments in favour of the opposite position, i.e. the claim that you can get an is from an ought? The idea that moral properties are reducible to natural properties that can be studied through empirical or scientific means is known as ‘ethical naturalism’. This school of thought rejects the so-called fact–value distinction and argues that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge. Proponents of ethical naturalism argue that humanity needs to invest in a science of morality which grounds morality and ethics in rational, empirical or scientific consideration of the natural world.

    A science of morality begins with two basic premises: (1) some people have lives which are objectively better than the lives of other people; and (2) these differences can be traced back to the material conditions in which people find themselves. I don’t think many people would disagree with premise (1). Idealists would object to premise (2) and argue instead that differences in well-being are traceable to ideas rather than material conditions. In a previous blog post I argued that materialist worldview is superior to the idealist worldview because the former enables us to fully explain the world around us whereas the latter does not. Materialism is the philosophical backbone of the scientific method, which has been extraordinarily successful in enabling us humans to understand how the universe works.

    In order for us to say that one outcome is objectively better than another outcome, we need to define a function v() with the property that v(x) > v(y) if and only if outcome x is objectively better than outcome y. The function v() might be referred to as a value function as it assigns values to different outcomes. Thus, the study of morality is closely linked to the study of value. How might we go about defining such a function? One way is to consider the likelihood of an outcome occurring. As a general rule, rare outcomes are considered to be more valuable than common outcomes. We can state this mathematically as v(x) > v(y) if and only p(x) < p(y), where p() is a function which assigns probabilistic to outcomes.

    Another way of saying this is that there is a decreasing function i() with the properly that v(x) = i[p(x)] for each outcome x. What other properties should the function i() have? If x and y are independent outcomes – that is, the occurrence of x does not affect the probability of occurrence of y, and vice-versa – then the probability if both outcomes occurring, z, is given by: p(z) = p(x)p(y). For such outcomes it makes sense to say that the value of both outcomes occurring is equal to sum of the values of each outcome occurring; that is, v(z) = v(x)+v(y), which implies that i[p(z)] = i[p(x)p(y)] = i[p(x)]+i[p(y)]. One decreasing function which satisfies this criterion is -log(). Thus, we can set v(x) = i[p(x)] = -log[p(x)] for any outcome x.

    Suppose now we have a random variable X which can take different outcomes x. We can analogously define the value of this random variable using the equation v(X) = ∑p(x)i[p(x)] = -∑ p(x)log[p(x)]. Those with a background in mathematics or physics might recognize this as the formula for entropy. The idea that value is equivalent to entropy is appropriately referred to as the ‘entropy theory of value’. But what does this theory actually tell us?! Let’s consider a simple example: wealth distribution. Suppose there are two people with relative wealth levels p and q, where p+q = 1. If X is a random variable which takes the value x with probably p and the value y with probability q, then v(X) = -plog(p)-qlog(q). Using the fact that p+q = 1, we have v(X) = -plog(p)-(1-p)log(1-p).

    It can be shown that this value is maximized when p = ½ and minimized when p = 0 or 1. In other words, the highest value is obtained when wealth is equally distributed between the two people and the lowest value when wealth is most unequally distributed. This result can easily be generalized to a population of any size and provides an objective justification for the intuitive idea that we should aim to minimize inequality. So perhaps you can get an ought from an is after all.

  • Is Bigfoot real?

    Bigfoot, also commonly referred to as Sasquatch, is a large, hairy creature said to inhabit forests in North America, particularly in the Pacific Northwest. Proponents for the existence of Bigfoot have offered various forms of evidence to support the creature’s existence, including anecdotal claims of sightings, as well as photographs, video and audio recordings, and casts of large footprints. Bigfoot is usually described as a muscular, bipedal human or ape-like creature covered in black, dark brown, or dark reddish hair. Common descriptions include broad shoulders, no visible neck, and long arms. The enormous footprints for which the creature is named are claimed to be up to 24 inches long and 8 inches wide.

    I have always been sceptical about the existence of these creatures. Recently, though, I have been wondering whether my scepticism was warranted. In this blog post I will go through some of the evidence put forward in support of Bigfoot’s existence, starting with the claims of sightings. According to the website Live Science, there have been over 10,000 reported Bigfoot sightings in the continental United States. Of course many, perhaps even most, of these sightings will be misidentifications. But even if 90% of them were misidentifications, that would still leave over 1,000 sightings unaccounted for. That figure seems too large to me to simply be ignored and suggests there is something out there that cannot be readily explained by mainstream science.

    We don’t have to take people’s word for it though, as there are many videos that purport to show these creatures in the wild. The most famous of these is the so-called Patterson-Gimlin film, a 1967 short motion picture which depicts an unidentified animal that the filmmakers claimed was a Bigfoot. Like most people my initial reaction on seeing this film was that the subject was a man in a gorilla suit. The more I watch it, however, the less convinced I am of this. In particular, the creature displays anatomical features that go way beyond what would be expected if the film was a hoax. For example, the creature’s foot seems to have something called a ‘mid-tarsal break’, a feature that is not present in humans but is present in non-human primates.

    We also have audio evidence. Bigfoot vocalizations such as howls, screams, moans, grunts, and whistles have been reported and recorded. Perhaps the most famous of these are the so-called Sierra Sounds, audio recordings from the early 1970s apparently capturing Bigfoot vocalizations in the Sierra Nevada mountains which are claimed to be a form of language. Retired U.S. Navy cryptographic linguist Scott Nelson analyzed the recordings and concluded, “It is definitely a language, it is definitely not human in origin, and it could not have been faked.” No formal studies have been conducted on the Sierra Sounds so we cannot say anything definitive about them. But having listened to these recordings myself, I find it hard to disagree with Nelson’s conclusion.

    Then there are the footprints, after which Bigfoot takes its name. Hundreds of alleged Bigfoot footprints have been reported and cast. Many of these are probably fakes; but just as with the Patterson-Gimlin film, some show anatomical features that go way beyond what would be expected from a hoax. For example, may of these prints show evidence of ‘dermal ridges’: patterned, raised corrugations of the skin found on the hands and feet of primates and other animals, more commonly referred to as fingerprints. It does not seem conceivable that a hoaxer would be able to fake these, or even that they would think to fake them. Then there is the fact that these prints are remarkably uniform in size and shape. If these footprints are the result of a hoax, it must be a very well-organised one.

    Many indigenous cultures across the North American continent tell tales of mysterious hair-covered creatures living in forests. According to anthropologist David Daegling, these legends existed long before contemporary reports of the creature described as Bigfoot. It’s also notable how consistent these stories are, even between cultures that historically would have had little to no contact with each other. We with our western chauvinism tend to dismiss such stories as nothing more than folklore, arrogantly assuming that if something cannot be explained by known science then it can’t possibly be true. Perhaps we ought to pay more attention to the people who were living North America for thousands of years before Europeans arrived. They might actually be trying to tell us something.

  • Von Neumann’s economic model

    In 1937 the Hungarian mathematician and physicist Jon von Neumann published a paper entitled A Model of General Economic Equilibrium, in which he set out an abstract mathematical model of an economy. Von Neumann’s model is still used widely today, particularly by Marxist economists. In this blog post I will provide a brief summary. The model is based on two premises: (1) commodities are produced not only from ‘natural factors of production’ also from each other; and (2) there may be a different number of technically possible processes of production than types of commodities. The second premise is captured by assuming that there are m types of commodities which can be produced by n processes, where in general m ≠ n.

    In each process j, quantities aij ≥ 0 are used up and quantities bij ≥ 0 are produced of commodity type i; let A = (aij) and B = (bij). In general, each commodity i will have an associated price pi, and each process j will be used with a certain ‘intensity’ qj. Given a 1xm price vector p = (pi), the vector pA represents the total cost of operating the different processes and the vector pB represents the total revenue obtained from the different processes. Similarly, given an nx1 intensity vector q = (qj), the vector Aq represents the total commodities of different types used up and the vector Bq represents the total commodities of different types produced. Von Neumann was concerned with the situation where the whole economy expands without change of structure, i.e. where the ratios between the intensities remains constant.

    It is assumed that the matrices A and B are known. The unknowns are: the prices p = (pi) ≥ 0 of the different commodity types; an ‘interest factor’ c = 1+r ≥ 0, where r is the interest rate or profit rate; the intensities q = (qj) ≥ 0 of the different processes; and a ‘coefficient of expansion’ d = 1+g  ≥ 0, where g is the growth rate for the economy. These are related by the vector inequalities pB ≤ cpA and Bq ≥ dAq, and also by the equations p(B-cA)q = 0 and p(B-dA)q = 0. The first inequality says that it is impossible to produce more revenue at the next time step (pB) than what was spent at the previous time step multiplied by the interest factor (cpA). The second inequality says that it is impossible for the economy to consume more at the next time step (dAq) than was produced at the previous time step (Bq).

    The equation p(B-cA)q = 0 says that if a process is unprofitable, it won’t be used and its intensity will therefore be zero. To see this, note that p(B-cA)q ≤ 0 for any intensity vector q. If p(B-cA)q < 0 then the economy will produce profits at a rate lower than the average rate for the economy, so by assumption we must have q = 0, which implies that p(B-cA)q = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, the equation p(B-dA)q = 0 says that if the economy consumes less of a commodity than was produced at the previous time step, the commodity becomes a free good and its price drops to zero. To see this, note that p(B-dA)q ≤ 0 for any price vector p. If p(B-dA)q < 0 then the economy consumes less than was produced at the previous time step, so by assumption we must have p = 0, which implies that p(B-dA)q = 0, a contradiction.

    The inequalities pB ≤ cpA and Bq ≥ dAq can be restated as c = maxj{(pB)j/(pA)j} and d = mini{(Bq)i/(Aq)i}, which shows that p uniquely determines c and q uniquely determines d. Von Neumann demonstrated that if there exist p and q satisfying the above equalities and equations, then c and d are both equal to pBq/pAq. In order to demonstrate that such solutions exist, von Neumann in addition assumed that A+B > 0, which implies that every process requires as an input or produces as an output some positive amount of every commodity. In a footnote to his paper, von Neumann also pointed out a link between his model and the theory of two-player zero-sum games, a theory that von Neumann himself was instrumental in developing. Let us now explore this link in a bit more detail.

    Fix a number e > 0 and let C = B-eA. We can interpret C as a payoff matrix for zero-sum game between a minimizing player, who chooses a price vector p ≥ 0, and a maximizing player, who chooses an intensity vector q ≥ 0. The game determined by the matrix C is said to have a solution (p*,q*,v*) if (p*C)j ≤ v* for each j and (Cq*)i ≥ v* for each i; the number v* is then referred to as the value of the game. Von Neumann’s famous 1928 minimax theorem states that v* = min max pCq = max min pCq, where the minimum is taken over the price vector p and the maximum is taken over the intensity vector q. Moreover, if (p,q,c,d) is a solution to the problem defined above, then c = d, and if we set e = c = d then v* = 0, which implies that the game is fair.

    In a Marxist interpretation, the ‘minimizing player’ may be identified with the working class and the ‘maximizing player’ with the ruling class. Of course, Marxists would argue that the game of capitalism is anything but fair, and is instead rigged in favour of the ruling class. This suggests that von Neumann’s model needs to be modified in order to fully capture the class relations of capitalism. I will leave this modification for a future blog post.

  • A two-velar theory for PIE

    In a series of recent blog posts I have argued, based on data compiled by Lars Steensland in his 1973 PhD thesis, that Proto-Indo-European – henceforth PIE – had two rather than three types of velar consonant: plain velars and labiovelars. In general, plain velars were palatalized and labiovelars delabialized in the satem languages, whereas both types of velar remained intact in the centum languges. However, under certain phonological conditions, plain velars remained intact in the satem languages and labiovelars were delabialized in the centum languages. In my view, this is what has led many scholars to incorrectly conclude that there must have been three types of velar in PIE. In this blog post I will summarize some of these phonological conditions.

    Palatalization was blocked after *s, including mobile *s, in all the satem languages, e.g.: *(s)kel- ‘cut’ > Sanskrit kalā́, Armenian čelkʿem, Albanian halë, Lthuanian skeliù, Old Church Slavonic skala, Greek σκάλλω; *(s)ker- ‘cut’ > Skt. apa-skara-, Avs. čarəman-, Arm. kʿorem, Alb. hirrë, Lth. skiriù, OCS krъnъ, Grk. κείρω. Similarly, palatalization was blocked after non-syllabic *n in all the satem languages, e.g.: *H₂enk- ‘bend’ > Skt. añcati, Avs. anku-, Arm. ankiwn, Lth. anka, OCS  jęčьmy, Grk. ἀγκών (c.f. *H₂ek- ‘sharp’ > Skt. aśáni-, Avs. asəŋga-, Arm. aseɫn, Alb. athëtë, Lth. ašnìs, OCS osla, Grk. ἀκή). In Indic, palatalization was also blocked before *s, e.g.: dhghem- ‘earth’ > Skt. kṣam-, Avs. zā̊, Alb. dhe, Lth. žẽmė, OCS zemlja, Grk. χθών.

    Palatalization was blocked before *r in all the satem languages, e.g.: *gerH₂- ~ *grH₂- ‘grow’ > Skt. járate, Avs. azarəšant-, Arm. cer, Alb. grurë, Lth. žìrnis, OCS zьrěti, Grk. ἐγείρω; *kerd- ~ *krd- ‘heart’ > Arm. sirt, Alb. kërth, Lth. širdìs, OCS srъdьce, Grk. καρδίᾱ; *kerH₂- ~ *korH₂- ~ *krH₂- ‘crow’ > Skt. śāri-, krkara-, Arm. sareak, karkač̣, Lth. šárka, kirkiù, OCS soraka, krъknǫti, Grk. κέρκαξ. In Balto-Slavic and Albanian, palatalization was also blocked before (PIE) *o, e.g.: bherghos ‘mountain’ > Arm. berj, OCS brěgъ, Gothic baurgs (c.f. *bhergh- ~ *bhrgh- ‘high’ > Skt. barháyati, Avs. bərəzant-); *kerH₂- ~ *korH₂- ~ *krH₂- ‘horn’ > Skt. śíras-, Avs. sarah-, Arm. sar, Alb. ka, Lth. šìršė, kárvė, OCS sъrъšenь, Russian koróva, Grk. κάρ.

    The same blocking of palatalization before *o also took place in Indo-Iranian, e.g.: *H₃moigho- ‘mist’ > Skt. meghá, Avs. maēγa-, Lth. miẽgas, Russ. migátʹ (c.f. *H₃meigh- ‘urinate’ > Skt. mḗhati, Avs. maēzaiti, Arm. mizem, Grk. ὀμείχειν, Lth. mę̃žù, Serbo-Croat mìžâm); *-ghe ~ *-gho ~ *-ghi (enclitic particle) > Skt. ha, gha, hí, Avs. zī, Lth. -gu, OCS -go, Grk. -χί; *ker- ~ *kor- ‘dark’ > Skt. karaṭa-, Arm. saṙn, Alb. thjer-më, Lth. šer̃kšnas, OCS srěnъ, Grk. κόρυζα; *leukos ‘bright’ > Skt. lōká-, Arm. lois, Lth. laũkas, Grk. λευκός (c.f. *luk- ‘shine’ > Skt. rúśant, Arm. lusanunkʿ, OCS vъs-lysъ, Old High German luhs). Thus, palatalization of plain velars was blocked before *o in all the satem languages apart from Armenian. As far as I am aware, this phonological rule has not been specified before.

    In Balto-Slavic, palatalization was blocked before resonants and *u when followed by a back vowel, and also before syllabic *l, e.g.: *ghelH₃- ~ *ghlH₃- ‘green’ > Lth. žélti, gel̃tas, OCS zelenъ, žlъtъ, Grk. χλωρός; *ghleH₁- ~ *ghloH₁- ‘shine’ > Lth. žlėjà, glodùs, OCS gladъkъ, OHG gluoen; *H₂ekmen ~ *H₂ekmon ‘stone’ > Skt. aśman-, Avs. asman-, Lth. ãšmens, akmuõ, OCS kamy, Grk. ἄκμων; *kleu- ~ *klou- ~ *klu- ‘hear’ > Skt. śrudhí, Avs. surunaoiti, Lth. šlovė̃, klausaũ, OCS slovo, Grk. κλέω; *kuon- ~ *kun- ‘dog’ > Skt. śvā́, Avs. spā, Arm. šun, Lth. šuõ (gen. šuñs), Sudovian kuo, Grk. κύων. The same blocking of palatalization before resonants took place in Albanian e.g.: *H₃mighleH₂ ‘mist’ > Lth. miglà, OCS mĭgla, Alb. mjegull, Grk. ὀμίχλη (c.f. *H₃meigh- ‘urinate’, above); *gonu- ~ *gnu- ‘knee’ > Skt. jā́nu, Arm. cunr, Alb. gju, Grk. γόνυ.

    Labiovelars were delabialized next to *u in all the centum languages, e.g.: *gʷou- ~ *gʷu- ‘cattle’ > Skt. gáuḥ, Grk. βοῦς, Lat. bōs, Old Norse kýr, Welsh bu; *gʷoukʷolH₁os ‘cowherd’ > Grk. boukólos, Wel. bugail (c.f. *kʷelH₁- ‘turn’ Skt. cárati, Grk. πέλω); *gʷu- ‘bend’ > Skt. gudám, Grk. γύπη, Lat. guttur, OHG chubisi, MIr. gūaire, Hit. kuttar; *H₁lengʷhus ‘lightweight’ > Skt. laghú-, Grk. ἐλαχύς (c.f. *H₁lengʷhros ‘lighweight’ > Grk. ἐλαφρός); *H₂uekʷ- *H₂ukʷ- ‘speak’ > Skt. vákti, Grk. ἔπος, Hit. ḫuek-, ḫuk-; *H₃ekʷ- ‘see’ > Skt. ákṣi, Grk. ὄψομαι, Lat. oculus, Got. augō, Wel. enep; *kʷekʷlos ‘wheel’ > Skt. cakrá-, Grk. κύκλος, ON hvēl; *kʷo- ‘what’ > Skt. ká, Grk. ποῦ, Lat. cum, Got. hwas; *kʷub- ‘bend’ > Skt. kubra-, Grk. κύβος, Lat. cubitum, Got. hups.

    In Greek, the sequences *KʷoR and *RoKʷ became *KʷuR and *RuKʷ by a process named Cowgill’s law after the American linguist Warren Cowgill, and the labiovelar was then delabialized by the adjacent *u, e.g.: *gʷenH₂- ~ *gʷonH₂- ~ *gʷnH₂- ‘woman’ > Skt. gnā, Grk. γυνή, Got. qino, OIr. ben; *negʷ- ~ *nogʷ- ‘naked’ > Skt. nagná-, Grk. γυμνός, Got. naqaþs, Hit. nekumanza. Similarly, in Germanic, the sequence *KʷRC became *KʷuRC, and the labiovelar was then delabialized by the following *u, e.g.: *gʷhent- ~ *gʷhnt- ‘hit’ > Skt. hánti, ON gunnr, Hit. kuenzi. Note that in Armenian, labiovelars merged with plain velars after *u prior to the palatalization of plain velars, e.g.: *dhugʷH₂ter ‘daughter’ > Skt. duhitár-, Avs. dugədar-, Arm. dustr, Lth. duktė̃, OCS dъšti, Grk. θυγάτηρ, Got. daúhtar.

    In Latin and Germanic, labiovelars were delabialized before (PIE) *o, e.g.: *kʷelH₁-, *kʷolH₁- ‘turn’ > Skt. cárati, Grk. πέλω, Lat. colō, Got. hals; *kʷoti- ‘how many’ > Skt. káti, Grk. πόσος, Lat. cottīdiē; *pekʷ-, *pokʷ- ‘cook’ > Skt. pácati, Grk. πέπων, Lat. coquō (< *kʷokʷ-), Wel. pobi. Labiovelars were also delabialized before resonants and before non-syllabic *i in these languages, e.g.: *gʷerH₂- ~ *gʷrH₂- ‘throat’ > Skt. giráti, Grk. βάραθρον, Lat. gurguliō, OHG querdar, ON kragi, Wel. breuant; *gʷrH₂u- ‘heavy’ > Skt. gurúḥ, Grk. βαρύς, Latin gravis, Got. kaurus, Wel. bryw; *H₃nogʷhl- ‘nail’ > Skt. aṅghri, ON nagl (cf. *H₃nogʷh- ~ *H₃ngʷh-  ‘nail’  > Skt. nakhá, Grk. ὄνυξ, Lat. unguis, Wel. ewin); *loikʷie- ‘lend’ > Skt. recáyati, ON leigja (c.f. *leikʷ- ‘leave’ > Lth. liekù, Grk. leípō, Lat. līquī, Gor. leihwan).

    Finally, note that in all the western languages – Italic, Germanic, and Celtic – labiovelars were delabialized before obstruents, e.g.: *H₁lengʷhtos ‘lightweight’ > Alb. lehtë, Got. leihts (c.f. *H₁lengʷhros ‘lighweight’ > Grk. ἐλαφρός); *likʷtos ‘left behind’ > Lat. relictus (c.f. *leikʷ- ‘leave’, above); *nekʷt- ~ *nokʷt- ‘night’ > Skt. nák, Grk. νύξ, Lat. nox, Got. nahts, Wel. noeth, Hit. nekuz; *pekʷtos ‘cooked’ > Grk. peptós, Lat. coctus, Wel. poeth. There are more phonological conditions that can be specified but I will leave these to a future blog post.

  • Only socialism can defeat austerity

    This week I attended a ‘people’s budget’ meeting held by Surrey Trades Council which featured talks by representatives from the Trade Union & Socialist Coalition (TUSC), Your Party, the Green Party of England & Wales, and the UK Labour Party. The TUSC representative spoke first and began by pointing out that continued low economic growth will almost certainly be used by the government as an excuse to squeeze funding for public services even further. They then said that they although they are encouraged to see left-leaning trends in the Green Party, they are also wary that the Greens are still not committed to reversing cuts to council funding imposed by previous Conservative governments, as well as the current Labour government.

    The Your Party representative spoke next and made clear that Your Party will not be standing candidates in the upcoming local elections in Surrey but will instead be looking to support independent candidates. They went on to say that they would like to see the Greens supporting Your Party in future, in the same way that members of Your Party supported the Greens in the recent Gorton & Denton by-election. A common theme that ran throughout their talk was the need for all of us on the left to work together as a united front to combat the stress being put on our public services by repeated budget cuts. They ended their contribution by voicing their support for a budget that puts people’s needs first – in other words, a people’s budget.

    Next up was the Green Party representative, already a councillor in Surrey. They agreed with the Your Party representative on the need to form left-wing coalitions, although their focus seemed to be more on stopping Reform rather than properly funding public services. Interestingly, they said that they used to be a member of the Labour party and that they were a Labour councillor, but they were kicked out during the purge of the left that occurred when Starmer took charge of the party. Their proposal for arresting the decline in public services was to bring them back into ownership by the local community; for example, by providing services such as special educational need provision within Surrey rather than contracting them out.

    The final speaker was the Labour Party representative, who began by affirming their left-wing credentials, telling us about how they had grown up in one of the most deprived areas of the UK and how they were a lifelong trade unionist. They lamented the loss of Sure Start, a government-funded initiative primarily targeting disadvantaged areas designed to provide support services for parents and children under four years old (or five in some areas). This policy was introduced by Labour in 1998 but was subsequently cut back in 2011 as part of the government’s austerity program. They finished by pointing out their priorities for the Surrey: social housing, public transport, special educational needs, and youth services.

    The floor was then opened to allow contributions from the audience. The first of these was from a TUSC member, who highlighted  the failure of the Labour party to do anything about the cuts to public services that were imposed by successive Conservative governments. They said that young people are fearful of the future, and face rising accommodation costs as well as rising costs of basic goods and services. These rising costs were exacerbated by the war in Ukraine and are likely to be exacerbated further by the recent outbreak of war in the Middle East. Both of these conflicts are driven by imperialist interests. They went on to argue that Your Party should be standing candidates now to counteract these imperialist forces and that in not doing so they are squandering a historic opportunity.

    The next contribution was from another TUSC member, who spoke about the difference between schools funded by the local authority and academies, which are essentially privatized schools. The Labour Party representative responded that in their view we shouldn’t have academies at all, and it is appalling that schools are being treated like businesses. As a general rule, they said, schools should never be managed by private companies. In the same vein, they argued that we should also get rid of private schools and that all children should be given equal access to opportunities. A two-tier education system gives an unfair advantage to those children who go to private schools and erodes hope for children who don’t.

    This last point was made in response to a pertinent question from another audience member to all the panel: what would you do to bring back hope to young people? The Green Party representative said they would aim to ‘make hope normal again’, by bringing back the politics of care and compassion into communities. The Your Party representative said that young people should be given a seat at the table and asked what changes they would like to see. The TUSC representative rightly pointed out that what gets most people into politics is seeing what it can achieve. To bring back hope to young people we need to take a bold stance and be clear that we can defeat austerity and provide them with a brighter future. The TUSC is the only political organization in the UK that is currently doing that.